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Summary: In this paper we study the implications of taxing overtime work in order to
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costs and idiosyncratic output risk in determining the choice of the workweek. In order
to obtain reliable estimates of the consequences of our policy experiment, we calibrate our
model economy to the substitutability between overtime and employment using business
cycle information. We ﬁnd that a tax-rate of 12% of overtime wages implements the desired
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that arise from plant-speciﬁc output risk and we ﬁnd that in this model economy the tax-
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In some European countries trade unions, economic analysts and policymakers alike have
proposed to shorten the workweek as a means to increase employment —France, for instance,
has recently enacted a 35 hour workweek and other countries like Germany are giving similar
measures serious consideration. In the academic literature Fitzgerald (1996), Fitzgerald
(1998), and Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) amongst others have studied the implications of
imposing legal restrictions on the number of hours worked. In this paper we study this
problem from a diﬀerent angle and we look for the tax-rate on overtime that results in a 35
hour workweek as part of the equilibrium of a fully explicit model economy.
Our analysis shows that the size of the overtime tax-rate that achieves this objective
depends crucially on the degree of substitutability between the duration of the workweek
and the size of the labor force (hereinafter referred to as the substitutability between the
workweek and employment). Consequently, we are very careful in providing a tight mea-
surement of this degree of substitutability, for which we use business cycle ﬂuctuations of
hours and employment. More explicitly, by the substitutability between the workweek and
employment we mean the following: When a ﬁrm wants to change the labor input of a plant,
the ﬁrm can change either the workweek of its existing labor force, or the size of its labor
force while keeping the workweek constant. In this paper these two ways of increasing the
labor input are imperfect substitutes for the following two reasons: (i) team-work; and (ii)
additional frictions that we have modelled as congestion based commuting costs.
By team-work, we mean that a plant can only be operated when all its workers are
present, and hence, that the length of the workweek is common to every worker in the plant.
Consequently, when a plant changes its workweek, the amount of capital available to each
worker does not change. On the other hand, when a plant changes the size of its labor force,
the amount of capital available to each worker also changes. This implies that workweek
length and employment are imperfect substitutes, inducing a form of decreasing returns to
employment that do not apply to the workweek. Moreover, it also implies that the wage-rate
1is a non-linear function of the number of hours worked.
Undoubtedly, one could think of many frictions that make the workweek and employment
less than perfect substitutes. In this paper we have chosen to model these frictions solely as
the result of congestion based commuting costs. Commuting implies that workers have to use
a certain amount of time before they provide any labor services. Furthermore, in this paper
we assume that commuting creates an externality and that, consequently, commuting costs
are increasing in employment. We make this assumption to impose further restrictions on
the substitutability between the workweek and employment. The imperfect substitutability
between employment and hours per worker introduces a non convexity in the choice set
that we deal with, following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), by assuming that agents
have access to employment lotteries. It goes without saying that we do not intend these
commuting costs to be taken literally. Instead, we think of them as a stand in for all the
frictions that limit the substitutability between the workweek and employment. What gives
commuting costs a modelling advantage over alternative mechanisms, such as the existence
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, internal commuting costs, or adjustment costs to move in and
out of the labor force, are the serious technical diﬃculties that these other frictions pose that
prevent their use in models that aggregate nicely into the representative agent construct.
In all other respects our model economy resembles the standard business cycle model
when overtime is not taxed. We calibrate a baseline model economy so that the average
duration of its workweek is 40 hours and so that it mimics the main features of the U.S.
economy. In addition to the standard steady–state properties, we also target some business
cycle statistics (the relative volatility of employment and hours per worker) to get a tight
measurement of the parameters that govern the frictions. We have discussed why our cal-
ibration seems reasonable to us by comparing our estimates with those in direct empirical
studies. We have also compared with Cho and Cooley (1994) results (that use PSID data at
a steady state frequency), and showed that they are extremely similar, what lends support
to our measurements.
Next, we look for the tax-rate on overtime that reduces the workweek from 40 to 35
2hours in steady-state. We ﬁnd that a 12% tax-rate on overtime wages achieves this end.
We also ﬁnd that this policy brings about a 7% increase in steady-state employment, a
10:2% decrease in steady-state output and a 4:2% decrease in steady-state productivity. In
addition, we compute the transition between the steady-states of the two model economies
in order to measure the welfare costs implied by overtime taxes. We ﬁnd that this welfare
costs are very signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, they are at least 0.6% of average consumption on a
ﬂow basis, which is a large number as far as welfare calculations go.
We also study the eﬀects of overtime taxation in an model economy where plants face
idiosyncratic output shocks and, consequently, the workweek varies across plants. In this
model economy we ﬁnd that the overtime tax-rate that achieves the desired ﬁve-hour re-
duction in the workweek is signiﬁcantly larger than the 12% that obtains in the benchmark
model economy (in which the workweek is the same in the entire economy), but the ﬁndings
concerning the eﬀect on employment are quite similar.
We also compare the business cycle behavior of the benchmark model economy with that
of the model economy with overtime taxes and we ﬁnd that this tax reduces the volatility,
both of output and of the labor input, rather considerably. However, since in our model
economy business cycles are the endogenous responses to productivity changes, this reduced
volatility should not necessarily be interpreted as a good thing.
Finally, we explore the robustness of our ﬁndings with respect to our identifying assump-
tions. We have explored the fact that not all workers may be aﬀected by the restrictions
on overtime, diﬀerent values of the degree of team work versus fatigue (the properties of
the production function), diﬀerent estimates of the size of the workforce, diﬀerent values
of commuting times, and we have found that the results are very similar to those reported
above, as long as the model economies are calibrated to the same degree of substitutability
between the workweek and employment.
Henceforth, our ﬁndings should be taken with care, given that our strategy to measure
the substitutability of hours and employment is based on business cycle information. It is
3conceivable that what shows as a business cycle friction is not a low frequency friction, and
that the actual substitutability between hours and bodies is larger than what we describe
in this paper. As we describe below, the exploration of this issue (that there are costs
in moving in and out of employment) requires some future technical developments. An
additional caveat that we ignore in this paper is the existence of changes in work practices,
that go together with the reduction of the workweek, that may increase ﬁrm’s productivity.
We think that to account for this issue similar techniques to the one developed in this paper
are needed, together with a detailed description of what those productivity gains may be.
We leave this issue outside the current study. Finally, we state another major caveat which
has to do with the fact that there are not distributional eﬀects in our study. That is, every
agent, workers and non-workers, is worst after the policy, not only ex-ante because everybody
has a higher probability of ending up working, but also ex-post. The lack of distributional
issues in the model makes the implementation of the policy that we study at least puzzling,
since it is welfare reducing. The inclusion of some form of market incompleteness would have
given an insurance role to this work sharing policy and a rationale to its implementation.
Obviously, the lack of distributional concerns is another limitation of our analysis, but as we
have already said, our primary interest in this paper is to quantify the trade-oﬀs between
employment and productivity, not to explain why a government would put in place such
a policy. All these considerations show that our ﬁndings should be considered as a ﬁrst
approximation to the study of the implications of work sharing policies. Moreover, we see
our contribution as a methodological benchmark, that can be extended to include additional
aspects that are currently missing, of the type of explicit modelling that is needed to assess
work sharing policies.
On the technical side, in this paper we develop the methods needed to compute the
equilibria of non–convex business cycle economies where the Second Welfare Theorem does
not hold because of distortionary taxation. This feature of our model economies forces us
to compute equilibria directly. This turned out to be a relatively daunting task because
households must know the wage function in order to compute their decisions and, as we have
already mentioned, in our model economy wages are non-linear functions of hours. These
4wage functions are part of the ﬁxed-point problem that must be solved to compute the equi-
librium.1 Our techniques are not easily applied to the characterization of equilibria with
all kinds of frictions. We would have liked to use labor adjustment costs, as in Kydland
and Prescott (1991), to introduce the friction in the substitutability between employment
and hours. Unfortunately, doing so imposes an additional level of extreme complexity, since
lagged employment status would enter as an additional state variable in the household prob-
lem, implying the existence of an endogenous distribution of households indexed both by
their lagged employment status and by their asset holdings. In general, even with complete
markets and with all households starting being alike, this would imply that, as time goes
by, households would become heterogeneous with respect to their asset holdings and their
lagged employment status, precluding the use of the representative household abstraction
that we have used here.
It goes without saying that this is not the only paper that has studied the implications
of policies designed to reduce the workweek. Perhaps the work that shares the most the
spirit of ours is Fitzgerald (1996) and Fitzgerald (1998). In those papers Fitzgerald studies
economies in which two types of agents are needed for production, and he evaluates the
consequences of policies that impose quantitative legal restrictions on the number of hours
worked. He ﬁnds that the increases in employment that result from this type of policies are
substantial. However, as we discuss below, his calibration strategy is likely to over-predict
the response of employment to this type of policies. Not surprisingly, he is aware of this
fact and he explicitly declares that he does not attempt to obtain a precise quantitative
assessment of these responses. Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) also study this issue. They
are interested in the implications of the restrictions in the duration of the workweek in a
model of job search and matching frictions, in which job creation entails ﬁxed costs, and
in which there are decreasing returns to the workweek. In their model economy the main
reason that makes the quantity restriction operative is that it aﬀects the bargaining power of
workers and ﬁrms asymmetrically. They ﬁnd that, in general, restricting the duration of the
1In the appendix we describe in some detail the computational methods that allow us to solve this
problem.
5workweek beneﬁts both the employed and the unemployed workers —even in the cases when
it decreases the wage-rate— and that it reduces both proﬁts and output. They also ﬁnd
that, in general, the eﬀects on employment of these quantity restrictions are very sensitive
to the degree of substitutability between consumption and leisure. Their work characterizes
qualitatively the outcomes for special cases of functional forms of the utility and production
functions.
Our paper builds on several diﬀerent strands of the literature. On the one hand, we use
the distinction between hours and bodies used in Ehrenberg (1971), and later in Kydland
and Prescott (1991), Fitzgerald (1995) and Fitzgerald (1998). We also build on the work
of Prescott and Townsend (1984), Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988), Prescott and R´ ıos-Rull
(1992), Kydland and Prescott (1991) and, especially, on Hornstein and Prescott (1993). All
these papers use lotteries to get around non-convexities in general equilibrium macroeco-
nomic models.
There are some papers that have used diﬀerent mechanisms to get adjustment along
both margins, hours and bodies.2 The closest to ours is Cho and Cooley (1994). They also
introduce ﬁxed costs associated with labor supply that depend on employment and relate
them to household production, although they acknowledge that they could also be interpreted
as costs of commuting or getting ready to work. The diﬀerence, though, is that they depend
on individual employment and, therefore, there is no externality. They are interested in
studying the implications of this model for the elasticity of substitution of labor supply, and
the volatility of hours, productivity and employment. They ﬁnd that, for the model to be
consistent with the empirical elasticities of labor supply, ﬁxed costs must be a function of
employment, what lends support to the mechanism that we use in this paper.
In many senses the paper that we are closest to is Kydland and Prescott (1991). In
that paper the calibration of the model to the relative volatilities of hours and employment
also plays a central role, even though the data are matched through a diﬀerent modelling
2See Cho and Cooley (1994), Bils and Cho (1994), Cho and Rogerson (1988) and Card (1989).
6device than the one that we use here. Kydland and Prescott (1991) use a version of our
benchmark model economy to study the role played by productivity shocks in accounting for
the business cycle volatility of U.S. output. Their economy satisﬁes the welfare theorems and,
therefore, Kydland and Prescott use the social planner’s problem as a shortcut to calculate
the competitive equilibrium allocation of their economy. They show that an economy that
diﬀers from a standard real business cycle model only on the existence of team-work has the
counterfactual property that all the variation in the labor input occurs along the employment
margin, while hours per worker remain constant. They then add labor adjustment costs to
their team-work model economy and show that this feature allows them to replicate the
observed substitutability between the workweek and employment. The model economy with
team-work and labor adjustment costs also satisﬁes the welfare theorems, but in this case
the lagged employment status becomes a part of the individual households’ state variables.
Section 2 describes the model and the use of lotteries to implement its recursive compet-
itive equilibrium. We also adapt the model to include overtime taxation and idiosyncratic
shocks. Section 3 describes how to map the model to data. Section 4 reports the results for
the baseline model, the transition, the model where plants face idiosyncratic output shocks
and the business cycle properties implied by the policy. We perform some robustness checks
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 oﬀers some concluding comments. Appendix A brieﬂy de-
scribes the computational methods that we have used, while Appendix B describes the tax
function.
2 The model
We start in Section 2.1 with the description of households and preferences and then we move
to technology in Section 2.2. Next, in Sections 2.3– 2.3.3 we describe the contracts that
agents use and the problems that they solve. In Section 2.4 we go on to deﬁne equilibrium
recursively in a way that is suited for computation. We then expand the economy to include
taxes in Sections 2.5. Section 2.6 extends the economy to have shocks to ﬁrm speciﬁc
7productivity. In response to those shocks, ﬁrms can adjust the number of hours per worker
but not their employment. This fact implies that in the cross-section there are more than
one type of workweeks.
2.1 Households and Preferences









where ct is consumption and `t is leisure in period t. The instantaneous utility function is
strictly concave and satisﬁes the Inada conditions. Finally, ¯ 2 (0;1) is the subjective time
discount factor.
An individual’s time endowment in each period is one. The amount of time that can be
allocated to work is 1¡`¡´(N), where ´(N) > 0 measures the amount of time required for
commuting to work every period that the individual is employed, and where N is aggregate
employment. We are assuming that there is congestion which creates a negative externality
in employment. In particular, we assume that ´(N) > 0, and ´0(N) > 0. Notice that
`(h;N) is not a continuous function since if hours worked are zero, no commuting is needed.
This introduces a non-convexity. We will see in detail below how agents deal with the
non-convexity. For technical reasons we deﬁne an underlying consumption possibility set
C = f[0;¯ c];[0;1]g, where ¯ c is an upper bound in consumption that is non-binding.3
3See Prescott and R´ ıos-Rull (1992) for a detailed explanation of why we impose this upper bound and
for why it is irrelevant.
82.2 Plant’s Technology
Production takes place in plants of which there may be a large number. Moreover, new
plants can be opened at zero costs. Plants are operated during a number of hours that is
the same for all workers. Plants also use capital and they are restricted to have one shift.4
We write the plant’s production function f as




where h denotes the workweek, n employment in the plant and k the amount of capital in the
plant.5 Variable z represents total factor productivity and we use it to incorporate shocks
to productivity. When we describe the stochastic version of the economy we assume that z
follows a ﬁrst order Markov process. Capital depreciates geometrically at rate ±.
Note that given the workweek, plants are subject to constant returns to scale.
When » = µ, we have the standard Cobb-Douglas technology where total hours and
not its decomposition in hours per worker and employment is what matters. When » = 1,
the technology is linear in hours and we have an extreme case of team production, where
workers are not subject to fatigue (an increase in the workers’ workweek results in an increase
of output of the same proportion).
4While some advocates of workweek reduction policies might have in mind gains in employment due to
increases in the number of shifts, we think that team–work is a more important feature in actual plants.
Accordingly, we chose this technology to capture how this policy aﬀects ﬁrms that need to increase their
labor force for pick demand reasons (see Beers (2000) for a discussion of both shift work and ﬂexible schedules
in recent U.S. data).
5In a sense, this form of writing the plant production function is a reduced form. We could redeﬁne h
to be the hours worked by the worker that works the least. However, given constant returns in bodies and
capital, the plants can split at no costs into units where all workers work the same number of hours.
92.3 Contracts
We assume complete markets. In this economy with non-convexities, there are eﬃciency
gains from the introduction of lotteries.6 The non-convexities apply only to the labor market,
so we only need to specify lotteries for the labor contract. Moreover, rather than having
plants buy measures of agents, as for example in Prescott and R´ ıos-Rull (1992), we ﬁnd
that it is easier to describe the economy by posing an, otherwise irrelevant, insurance ﬁrm
that contracts in measures with households and that contracts in real quantities with the
operators of plants. In the absence of distortionary taxation and the commuting externality,
the equilibrium would have been optimal under this market structure.7
2.3.1 The ﬁrms’ problem
To see the nonlinearity of the wage as a function of the workweek, we start ﬁxing the
workweek, h, and we use wh to denote the salary paid to a worker who works for h hours.






µ ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ n wh (3)
where r is the rental rate of capital (the interest rate). There is free entry, which implies that
ﬁrms have zero proﬁts. Moreover, there are constant returns to scale, so we can normalize
the size of a ﬁrm to have one employee that works h hours. This means that for any given





1¡µ ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ wh (4)
with solution given by k(z;h;r).
6See Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988) Prescott and R´ ıos-Rull (1992), for earlier applications of lotteries
to labor contracts.
7Obviously, the actual details of what types of ﬁrms buy and sell these lotteries do not matter. We could
have chosen other arrangements without changing the equilibrium allocations (see Prescott and R´ ıos-Rull
(1992)).
10We then determine the salary for workweek h as the value of wh that satisﬁes
0 = z h
» [k(z;h;r)]
1¡µ ¡ k(z;h;r)(r + ±) ¡ wh (5)
using the zero-proﬁt condition.
In fact, we can do this for all h and we obtain the wage rate wh as a function of the
interest rate. As we can see from equation (5) this is a non-linear function of h. In sum,
plants can be indexed by their workweek and their capital per worker.
To describe the number of existing one-worker plants at any point in time we can use a
measure Ψ deﬁned not over C, but just over its second component, the workweeks. Let Ψ(B)
be the measure of plants of size one worker that operates a workweek of size h 2 B ½ [0;1]
for any Borel set B.

















Let C be an appropriate family of subsets of C, say, its Borel ¾–algebra. Households choose
probabilities over C. Let M be the space of signed measures that includes the probabilities.
11The per-period consumption possibility set of households is indexed by aggregate employ-
ment in the period:
X(N) = fx 2 M : x is a probability; i:e: x ¸ 0; and x(C) = 1; (9)
If h 2 (0;1]; and x([0;¯ c];[h;1]) > 0; then h · 1 ¡ ´(N)g:
where the last condition is the requirement that in no case working hours plus commuting
time is greater than the time endowment.





Note that function U is linear in x.
The price of x is given by a linear function, which we write as
R
C q(c;h) dx, where q(c;h)
gives the value of consuming c units and working h hours with probability one. A detailed
discussion of q can be found in Section 2.3.3.
Moreover, households own assets a, and choose savings that we denote by a0. Since
working does not have dynamic implications (a period later agents with wealth a0 are identical
regardless of what was the labor situation today) all agents with the same assets choose the
same savings independently of the outcome of the lottery. These considerations imply that
the budget constraint of the household is
Z
C
q(c;h) dx + a
0 = (1 + r) a:
We can deﬁne an indirect current return function R that takes as given the saving be-
havior of the household and solves for the optimal x. The static household problem given








q(c;h) dx + a
0 = (1 + r) a (12)
where both the objective and the constraint are linear.
We write x(a;N;q;r;a0) as the optimal choice for a household with a assets, that saves
a0, when aggregate employment is N, and prices are given by function q and by r.
2.3.3 The intermediate insurance companies
These companies have zero proﬁts and their only role is to insure the households. They deal
with both households and ﬁrms and they choose signed measures y 2 M. In exchange of y
that sells at price q, these ﬁrms acquire the rights to working time that they sell to plants at
price wh and provide to consumers the consumption implied by the lottery. These insurance
ﬁrms contract with a large number of households which allows a law of large numbers to
hold (see Uhlig (1996)), which precludes any aggregate uncertainty over the realizations of
the lotteries.












This problem only has a solution if the pricing function is such that its consumption
component only depends on the ﬁrst moment of the measure y and if the wage is given by









wh x([0;¯ c];dh) (14)
13and, hence, we can rewrite the households’ budget constraint as
Z
C
c x(dc;[0;1]) + a
0 = (1 + r) a +
Z
C
wh x([0;¯ c];dh) (15)
Accordingly, we redeﬁne the current return of the household after the static optimization
problem described in equation (11) as R(a;N;wh;r;a0) and the lottery choice as x(a;N;wh;r;a0).
An important property of x(a;N;wh;r;a0) given the properties of wh and q8 is that it
has positive mass in at most two points, one of which is fc;0g where c 2 [0;¯ c]. It is easy to
see why this is the case. Strict concavity of function u, and convexity of the choice set for
h > 0 shows that households prefer to get a point with mass on only one h than another
point with mass in more than one point with positive h and the same mean.
So, the solution to the household problem can only be one of the following three possi-
bilities. One, there is positive mass in only one point with h > 0; two, there is positive mass
only in h = 0; and three, there is positive mass in two points, one with h = 0 and one with
h > 0. The use of a production function that satisﬁes the Inada conditions guarantees that
in our economies there is always mass at some h > 0. We denote by h(a;N;wh;r;a0) the
point with positive mass in h > 0 and by n(a;N;wh;r;a0) the mass at that point.
2.4 The recursive problem
Once we have set the within periods contracting problems, we can turn to deﬁne equilibrium
for the economy. We will do so recursively and we start by deﬁning the aggregate state
variables of the economy. These are those variables that are needed to evaluate and forecast
all prices. For this economy, they are total factor productivity z and aggregate capital K.
The household’s individual asset level a is also part of the individual state vector. In order
for a household to solve its maximization problem it has to be able to compute the values
8Actually this is a property derived from a standard result in linear programming, see Hornstein and
Prescott (1993).
14for fr;wh;K0;Ng. We assume that the household uses functions fÁr;Áwh;GK;GNg to do
so. These functions map the aggregate state variables into the variables that the household
needs to know to solve its maximization problem. The value function in expression (16) is
indexed by these functions for clarity. In later expressions we omit the indices. We have
v(z;K;a;Á;G) = max
a0 R(a;N;wh;r;a





r = Ár(z;K) (18)
wh = Áw(z;K;h) (19)
K
0 = GK(z;K) (20)
N = GN(z;K) (21)
H = GH(z;K) (22)
Let a0 = ga(z;K;a;Á;G) denote the solution to this problem. Substitution of this solution
in (11) yields x(z;K;a;Á;G), and given that our problem puts mass in at most two points,
it also yields h = gh(z;K;a;Á;G) and n = gn(z;K;a;Á;G). Note that equation (22) is not
really necessary to solve the problem of the household. We include it just for completeness
sake and to state that this function is needed to deﬁne an equilibrium. We are now ready
to do so.
Deﬁnition 1 A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of decision rules for households
fga;gh;gng, a value function v, functions for aggregate variables fGK;GH;GNg, for the
interest rate Ár(z;K), a wage schedule function Áw(z;K;h), a measure of ﬁrms Ψ(z;K),
and a capital renting policy of the plants k(z;r;h) such that i) the decision rules and value
function satisfy (16), ii) the agent is representative, i.e. ga(z;K;K;Á;G) = GK(z;K),
gh(z;K;K;Á;G) = GH(z;K) and gn(z;K;K;Á;G) = GN(z;K), iii) plants choose capi-
tal optimally and have zero proﬁts, i.e. they solve (4) and (5), iv) the labor market clears,
15i.e., Ψ has mass in only one point with positive hours worked which is given by GH(z;K) and
Ψ[z;K;GH(z;K)] = GN(z;K), and v) the market for capital clears, K = Ψ[z;K;GH(z;K)] =
˙ k[z;Ár(z;K);GH(z;K)].
A steady state for a deterministic version of this economy (a ﬁxed value of total factor
productivity ¯ z) is a just a number K¤ such that, when substituted in the above general
deﬁnition of recursive equilibrium, satisﬁes
K
¤ = GK(¯ z;K
¤); (23)
in addition to all the requirements above.
2.5 The economy with overtime taxation
An overtime tax is a policy ¿(¯ h;h) such that if h > ¯ h then ﬁrms have to pay ¿(¯ h;h)¢ ˆ wh to the







µ ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ n[ wh + ¿(¯ h;h) ¢ ˆ wh] (24)
Equations (4) and (5) also change in a similar fashion. An important feature of our
computational procedure is that all the relevant objects that the agent face are diﬀerentiable.
Therefore, we can use the ﬁrst derivatives to help characterize the solution. To this end,
we use a function ¿ that is diﬀerentiable at h = ¯ h. The properties of this function are that
¿(¯ h;h) = 0 if h · ¯ h, ¿(¯ h;h) > 0 if h > ¯ h, limh!1 = ¯ ¿,
@¿(¯ h;h)
@h is non decreasing. Note that
given these assumptions, for the tax to have any eﬀects, ¯ h has to be lower than the target
of hours worked.9
9See Appendix B for details.
16All the proceeds of the overtime tax are redistributed lump sum to the households. This
changes equation (12) to
Z
C
q(c;h) dx + a
0 = (1 + r) a + T (25)
where T are the transfers.
Equation (15) also has to be adjusted, specifying the transfers not as a number T, but
as a function T(z;K).
In addition to the changes in the proﬁt function of ﬁrms and in the budget constraint
of the household, we have to add a balanced budget condition for the government to the
deﬁnition of equilibrium. This condition is simply that
T(z;K) = ¿[¯ h;GH(z;K)] (26)
2.6 Shocks to Plant level productivity: the heterogeneous workweek model
Next, we introduce a new element in our model economy to induce cross–sectional variation
of workweeks across plants, as a result of plant speciﬁc shocks. This new element implies
that taxing overtime adversely aﬀects the ﬂexibility of ﬁrms to adjust their labor input to
temporary changes in productivity (or demand). In the calibration stage we discuss the
extent to which this may be the case.
To model the importance of plant level ﬂexibility, we assume i.i.d. transitory shocks to
plant level productivity, revealed after the workers have been hired but before production
takes place, and independent from the economy wide productivity shock.10 Consequently,
the only margin that can be used to exploit this additional productivity change is to vary
10A more theoretically consistent way to describe this would be to say that it exists a time to hire
restriction. The nature of the timing is not dissimilar to that in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1990),
although, in that paper hours cannot adjust. This shock could be interpreted as a demand shock, but it is
simpler to specify it as a plant speciﬁc productivity shock.





where all variables are as before except for the plant speciﬁc shock, s. The shock takes only
ﬁnitely many values s 2 fs1;¢¢¢ ;smsg and is drawn from probability distribution °s.
This change requires the indexation of agents’ choices by the possible realizations of the
shock, resulting in
X(N) = fx1;¢¢¢ ;xms : xs 2 M : xs is a probability, i:e: xs ¸ 0; xs (C) = 1; (28)
xs([0;¯ c];f0g) is the same for all s;
if h 2 (0;1]; and xs ([0;¯ c];[h;1]) > 0; then h · 1 ¡ ´(N)g:
Note that all we are adding is that the employment probability cannot depend on the idio-
syncratic shock of the plant. From the point of view of the ﬁrm, equation (4) has to be







» ¡ k(r + ±) ¡ wfh(s)g (29)
with solution given by k(z;fh(s)g;r). The zero proﬁt condition requires that for each vector
fh(s)g, the salary wfh(s)g satisﬁes




» ¡ k(z;fh(s)g;r)(r + ±) ¡ wfh(s)g (30)
The rest of the changes to adapt the model to the case with idiosyncratic shocks to ﬁrms is
a tedious minor variation of the equations described above and we omit them for brevity.
183 Mapping the Model to Data
In order to calibrate the model we have to be aware that this model is standard in all
dimensions except for the existence of team work and an externality based commuting costs.
Team work is described by the parameter ». This feature is hard to measure. We choose
the economy to be midway between the standard Cobb-Douglas case where » = µ, and the
strict fatigue-less case where » = 1, and we set » = :85. As part of our robustness tests we
will look at economies that are closer to these extremes. The choice of this parameter aﬀects
the choice of the other parameters. Therefore, when we look at economies without fatigue,
we recalibrate the economy.




With regard to the rest of the model, we choose the time period to be a quarter and we
assume that household preferences can be described by the following standard Cobb-Douglas










where 0 < ® < 1 and ¾ > 0.
Therefore, the model has 10 parameters. Two of those parameters characterize the
process for the Solow residual, the auto–regressive coeﬃcient ½ and the variance of the shock
¾². We take these measurements from Prescott (1986). Another parameter is the already
mentioned parameter » (in Section 5 we explore alternative choices for this parameter as a
robustness check). The model has 7 additional parameters: µ, ±, ¯, ®, ¾, AN and ¸. We
need to impose seven conditions to set these 7 parameters. The conditions that we impose
19are
1. A labor share of 64%.
2. A steady state yearly interest rate of 4%.
3. A steady state consumption to output ratio of .75.
4. A steady state fraction of the working-age population who work of 75%. See Kydland
and Prescott (1991) for a discussion of this choice.
5. We impose a 40 hour workweek. We assume that out of the 168 hours in each week,
68 of them are devoted either to sleeping or personal care. This implies that workers
work 40% of their time. See Cooley and Prescott (1995) for a discussion of this choice.
6. The relative volatility of hours and bodies is .5 as in the U.S. data. See Kydland and
Prescott (1991) or Cooley and Prescott (1995).
7. Average commuting time of 5 hours a week (30 minutes each way).
This target requires some further comments. The actual value of this target is not very
important. What is important is the role that it plays in creating a friction between
adjusting the workweek and adjusting employment. This role depends more on the
derivative of ´(N) than on its value. In section 5 we increase the commuting time to
almost ten hours per week (ﬁfty minutes each way) as a robustness exercise.11
Imposing those 7 conditions results in the values of the parameters reported in Table 1.
Note that the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is determined as part of the calibration process
unlike many other studies where it is exogenously set at some level.
Obviously, this is not the only plausible calibration strategy. In particular, a natural
question in this context is to what extent can business cycles variation be informative about
the substitutability between hours and employment, and how does it relate to alternative
11See French (2000) for an estimation of commuting costs.
20Table 1: Baseline Economy Parameters.
» AN ¸ ® ¾ ± µ ¯
.85 .35 6.75 .33 1.5 .025 .64 .99
measurement procedures that draw on microeconomic observations to calibrate. The latter
approach has been used by Bils and Cho (1994) and Cho and Cooley (1994). Both studies
use individual variation from the PSID to ﬁnd the values of some preference parameters. In
fact, Cho and Cooley (1994) use two diﬀerent calibration strategies. The ﬁrst one is quite
similar to ours, in the sense that they use aggregate data. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁx the value of
one of the preference parameters and get the others to ﬁt three observed facts for the US
economy (the employment rate, the proportion of time spent in labor market activity and
the ratio of ﬂuctuations in hours per person relative to that in employment). Their second
calibration strategy uses the ﬁrst two facts mentioned above and draw on microeconomic
observations to calibrate one the remaining preference parameters, as in Bils and Cho (1994).
Both papers use ﬁrst order conditions to get a relationship between employment and hours
that they estimate using PSID data. Then, they use the regression coeﬃcient to recover one
of the preference parameters, while the other is arbitrarily ﬁxed to some value as in the ﬁrst
approach.
We prefer to use aggregate data for our calibration for several reasons. First, there seems
to be some evidence of reporting errors for the PSID regarding hours per week. In fact, Bils
and Cho (1994) increase their estimate by 24%, and Cho and Cooley (1994) acknowledge
that the results based on the model calibrated to microeconomic observations are not as
encouraging as those obtained with the model calibrated to aggregate observations. Second,
given the assumed functional forms, it is not possible to get a clean relationship relating the
two relevant preference parameters, as in Cho and Cooley (1994), that allows for a simple
estimation using the PSID. Third, there is not a simple answer to the issue of how to treat
people in the data that move in and out of the labor force.
21Table 2: Comparison of cyclical properties of alternative calibration strategies
Standard Deviation Cho and Cooley Cho and Cooley
Relative to Output’s using Aggregate Data using PSID Data Baseline
Consumption 0.30 0.32 0.31
Investment 3.20 3.11 3.12
Capital 0.27 0.26 0.29
Aggregate Hours 0.60 0.43 0.43
Hours per worker 0.14 0.16 0.15
Employment 0.46 0.28 0.29
Output per worker 0.43 0.59 0.58
The source for the Cho and Cooley economies statistics is Cho and Cooley (1994).
Still, we should not ignore alternative measurements of the substitutability between the
workweek and employment. In this respect, Table 2 shows the business cycle properties of
our model economy and those obtained by Cho and Cooley (1994) using their two strategies.
Our baseline model economy’s statistics lie between the two sets of statistics obtained by
Cho and Cooley, perhaps closer to the one that uses microeconomic studies.
Another justiﬁcation of the validity of our calibration strategy comes from its implications
for the elasticity of employment with respect to hours, a subject of numerous empirical
studies. Some of these studies, Bosch (1990), Brunello (1989), DeRegt (1988) and Wadwhani
(1987), ﬁnd values for this elasticity in the range [:35;:6]. Others, such as Hunt (1996), Hunt
(1997) and Cette and Taddei (1994) ﬁnd slightly lower values in the range [:1;:3]. The
elasticity of employment with respect to hours in our baseline model economy is 0.57, still
in the range of plausible values. As an additional consideration, we explore a heterogeneous
workweek version of the model in Section 4.3. In this economy the elasticity takes a slightly
lower value of 0.51. We conclude that our approach to the measurement of the trade-oﬀs
between the workweek and employment, while being on the high side, is well within what
the literature considers acceptable.
224 Main Findings
In this section we report the answers to the questions that we posed. In Section 4.1, we start
reporting the steady state implications of the introduction of the policy. In Section 4.2 we
report the welfare implications and the transition path of the economy once the policy is in
place. In section 4.3 we show the answers for the heterogeneous workweeks model economy,
and discuss the diﬀerences with the baseline. Finally, section 4.4 shows how the tax policy
aﬀects the business cycle behavior of this economy.
4.1 Steady State Findings
Table 3 shows, along the steady state of the baseline economy, the steady state of an economy
where the tax policy yields the desired workweek reduction (to ease comparisons the table
includes the percentage change for each relevant variable (%var), as well as the percentage
change relative to the hours per worker percentage change (%var
%h ). The table shows that a
tax rate on overtime of 12% induces households to reduce hours worked by 12.5% (from 40
to 35 hours a week). The workweek reduction from 40 to 35 hours generates a 7:04% increase
in employment, a 10:2% decrease in output and a 4:2% decrease in productivity. Note that
due to the reduction in productivity, the reduction in the salary is larger than the reduction
in hours per worker.
Table 3: Baseline Economy Findings. » = :85
Economy ¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h
Hours per worker 40.0 35.0 -12.5 1
Employment 0.75 0.80 7.04 0.57
Total hours 30.0 28.0 -6.29 -0.50
Output 1.00 0.90 -10.2 -0.82
Productivity 1.00 0.96 -4.19 -0.34
Salary 0.86 0.72 -16.1 -1.29
234.2 The transition
As it is well known, an assessment of a policy cannot be carried out based on steady state
comparisons since the two economies have diﬀerent initial conditions. In order to assess the
implications of the policy, we take the steady state of the economy without taxation and
impose the workweek reduction policy.
Figure 1 shows the transition paths for the main aggregate variables that we are interested
in plus aggregate capital (the aggregate state variable). To make the picture clearer, we
normalize all variables so that in the steady state of an economy without taxes their value
is one. The ﬁrst thing to note is that the adjustment of most variables is very fast. Indeed,
hours and employment immediately jump to almost their ﬁnal value. Only capital adjusts









































Figure 1: Introduction of the Tax. Transition Path of the main variables.
The computation of the transition also allows us to compute the welfare cost of the
24policy. We compute the welfare cost as the proportional decrease in consumption (both for
the employed and the unemployed) with respect to the steady state without the policy that
would leave agents indiﬀerent to implementing the policy. Before reporting the number we
state a major caveat which has to do with the type of friction that we use to measure the
substitutability between hours per worker and employment. Recall that in the model there
is an externality based commuting cost. As a result, the increase in employment increases
the commuting time and reduces utility. If we had modelled the economy with a diﬀerent
type of friction, the utility cost of the policy would have been very diﬀerent, and probably
much smaller, as the friction does not need to have utility costs as large as those imposed by
the externality. This is due in part to the fact that we calibrate the derivative of the utility
to get the right relative variation of hours per worker and employment, and the diﬀerences
in welfare are diﬀerences in levels of utility. Henceforth, the welfare cost that we compute is
likely to overstate the actual welfare costs of the policy. The drop in average consumption
that makes agents indiﬀerent between the previous situation and the implementation of the
policy is 8.1%. Because of the above considerations regarding the friction, we also computed
the welfare costs that would come up if we do not take into account the changes in commuting
time that are imposed by the externality. In this case, the welfare costs are of a smaller order
of magnitude, .6% of average consumption. We think that the second number is a better
assessment of the welfare costs of the policy, given that is likely to be more in line with what
would have resulted from modelling the frictions in the labor market diﬀerently.
We want to make the point that welfare calculations usually yield very small numbers
due to the concavity of the utility function, and therefore even .6% of average consumption
is a large welfare cost.
4.3 Heterogeneous workweeks economy
We next perform the same experiment than in the baseline economy in a model economy
where plants are subject to idiosyncratic shocks to productivity that generate a cross–
25sectional distribution of workweeks across plants and households. In particular, we want
to know whether our answers diﬀer from those obtained in the baseline model economy.
Recall that in this version of the model only variations in the workweek can be used to
accommodate within the period the idiosyncratic shock.
4.3.1 Mapping the heterogeneous workweeks economy to data
To calibrate this version of the model, we use the cross–sectional distribution of workweeks
of individuals (not of ﬁrms) as reported by the PSID. The reasons for that are simple.
In the model economy plants are of size one worker, and what we really care for is the
personal workweek distribution. We use a simple process to parameterize the model, an
equal probability, three valued i.i.d. shock. This means that we have three parameters to
set and three new statistics to match.
We select a sample of individuals that satisfy the following criteria: males, family heads,
full-time workers, salaried workers, private sector jobs and a minimum of two-years experi-
ence on the main job. Some of these criteria require comments. We choose private sector
workers because public ﬁrms might not adjust in the same way as private ﬁrms in response
to idiosyncratic shocks to productivity. We also need those workers to have some years of
experience to avoid capturing hours behavior of new entrants that might distort the results.
We also eliminate some outliers who work less than 10 hours a week or more than 70. We
then order this sample according to the number of weekly hours worked and divide it in
three equally large groups.12 We compute average weekly hours for each group and for the
whole sample. Finally, we compute the percentage deviation of each of those averages with
respect to the whole sample average. Those are the three statistics to replicate, and the
associated parameters to be determined are the values of the shocks. The cross-sectional
hours distribution is such that each third of workers work 1.18, 1.02 and .80 of mean hours.
12To compute total hours worked per week on the main job we need to combine the information provided
by the following variables: total annual hours of work on main job, weekly hours on main job and total
annual overtime hours.
26This means that, in the model economy without the policy, one third of the plants work 45.7
hours a week, another third 39.2 hours and the remaining third 30.6 hours.
4.3.2 The workweek reduction tax in the heterogeneous workweeks economy
Table 4 shows the implications of two diﬀerent long workweek taxes in the heterogeneous
workweeks economy, and compares their implications with those of the baseline model econ-
omy. The ﬁrst experiment imposes the same tax as in the baseline model economy. The
reduction in average hours per worker is smaller than in the baseline. This is an obvious
implication because the tax does not aﬀect everybody, only the fraction of workers that
are beyond the long workweek threshold. In this speciﬁcation a 12% tax achieves a 7.43%
reduction on hours per worker. When we normalize by the percentage change in hours per
worker, we obtain an elasticity of employment to hours per worker of 0.51 (versus 0.57 in the
baseline model economy). Consequently, the employment gains, are much smaller, 3.85%
versus 7.05%, as are the productivity and salary losses. The second experiment poses a 19%
tax rate, which is approximately the tax needed to achieve a reduction of the workweek of
10% (comparable to the 12.5% of the baseline model economy). In this experiment we obtain
a larger response of employment as we expected. However, as a fraction of the reduction of
the workweek, the gains in employment are smaller than those of the baseline model econ-
omy, while the productivity loses are larger. The reasons for this are straight forward. Not
only the larger taxes distort more the economy, but also the distortion aﬀects mostly the
more productive sectors of the economy, so that the salary reductions are larger per hour of
reduction of the workweek.
We also computed the standard deviation of hours to see the implications of the policy
for the intensive margin. The reduction in the volatility of hours turns out to be 27:3%.
This is also not surprising since the tax punishes in the margin only the plants with long
workweeks. In fact, when the tax policy is in place, the cross-sectional distribution of hours





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28To summarize, the implications of a given tax on long workweeks are larger in the het-
erogeneous ﬁrms model economy than in baseline model economy. We think that these two
models encompass the relevant range of values since they yield reasonable elasticities. How-
ever, these results also show that the baseline model is not a bad starting point since the
implied elasticities of employment with respect to hours per worker do not diﬀer much, both
lying in the range of plausible values found in microeconometric studies.
4.4 Business Cycles Implications
We want to know how the tax policy aﬀects the business cycles behavior of this economy.
In Table 5 we report the main business cycle statistics for the baseline economy when it is
subject to productivity shocks, both with and without long workweek taxes. In the ﬁrst
column, we show the results for the economy without taxes, and in the second, the results
for the economy with a 12% tax on overtime.
Table 5: Baseline Economy Business Cycle Properties.
Statistics (HP ﬁltered logged data) Ec. ¿ = 0 Ec. ¿ = 0:12
Std. dev. Output 1.07 0.92
Relative std. dev. of investment to consumption 3.33 2.77
Std. dev. of hours per worker 0.16 0.03
Std. dev of employment 0.31 0.24
Relative std. dev. of hours per worker to employment 0.51 0.14
As is standard in real business cycle models, productivity shocks account for almost 2=3
of output volatility in the economy without tax policy. Recall that the model was calibrated
to match the relative volatility of hours per worker and bodies, .5 for the US economy. If
commuting costs were constant (no congestion), this model would have yielded zero volatility
in hours per worker.
The introduction of overtime taxation not only has the eﬀects of reducing work eﬀort
29and increasing employment, but it also dampens the volatility of output by 16%. It does
so by reducing the volatility of employment by one fourth but, especially, by reducing the
volatility of hours per worker by four ﬁfths. The steepness of both the tax and the friction
is what accounts for this result. The relative volatility of investment to consumption also
goes down after the introduction of taxation.
5 Robustness
In this section we explore whether the ﬁndings of the previous sections are speciﬁc to the
baseline model economy or also hold for some variations of the model. In Section 5.1 we look
at alternative values for the parameter » that measures the degree to which the economy is
subject to team work. In Section 5.2 we calibrate the economy to larger commuting costs.
Section 5.3 looks at what the ﬁndings would have been without attempting to match the
hours per worker to employment relative volatility and argues why it is important to do so.
In Section 5.4 we calibrate the model to a higher fraction of the working age population to
have an idea of the relative margins of adjustment.
5.1 The degree of team work versus fatigue
Recall that the parameter » measures the extent of team work. Little is known about the
margin represented by this parameter. The range of possible values is » 2 [µ;1]. The
lower bound is the labor share, and when » takes this value, production collapses to the
standard Cobb-Douglas case. To explore the role of this parameter in shaping the ﬁndings,
we pose two additional economies that are still further away from the Cobb-Douglas case.
To this purpose, the whole economy has to be recalibrated to match the seven statistics
described above. The required two sets of parameter values are described in the ﬁrst two
rows of Table 6. Notice that all parameters have to be readjusted. In particular, a larger
», by increasing the importance of team work, imposes an increase in the relevance of those
30features that prevent full employment (e.g. the parameters of the externality are larger and
so is the risk aversion).
Table 6: Other Economies Parameters.
Economy » AN ¸ ® ¾ ± µ ¯
High » Ec. .92 .83 9.75 .32 2.1 .025 .64 .99
Very High » Ec. 1.00 3.74 15.0 .33 2.6 .025 .64 .99
High Commuting Time .85 .54 6.25 .34 1.9 .025 .64 .99
High Employment rate .85 .17 7.65 .36 1.5 .025 .64 .99
We report the implications for these economies of implementing the long workweek tax
in Table 7. As we can see, compared to the baseline model economy, the high » economies
display lower employment gains than in the baseline. Moreover, reductions in productivity
are larger and so are the reductions in the salary. This result is not surprising, since the
higher the diﬀerence between the labor share (µ) and the degree of team work (»), the more
attractive it is to increase the labor input by increasing the workweek instead of employment.
To summarize, the conservative assumption regarding the role of team work that we use
in the baseline model economy, if anything, is likely to under predict the disruptions induced
by the long workweek tax policy.13
5.2 Higher Commuting Costs
To explore the role of commuting costs, we include a version of the model economy calibrated
to ﬁfty minutes of commuting time each way. All the other targets remain the same. We
report the parameter values of this model economy in the third row of Table 6. We then
report the ﬁndings in Table 8.
13One might think that » = 1 is not an extreme assumption and could interpret that as being a ”local”
property of the technology around 40 hours per week. It is sometimes assumed that there is some warm-up
costs to operating a plant, and fatigue does not have to become a dominant factor until much longer hours
are worked. However, the results in Table 7 show that even around 40 hours fatigue plays a role.
31Table 7: Degree of team work versus fatigue
» = :85 Economy ¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h
Hours per worker 40.0 35.0 -12.5 1
Employment 0.75 0.80 7.04 0.57
Total hours 30.0 28.0 -6.29 -0.50
Output 1.00 0.90 -10.2 -0.82
Productivity 1.00 0.96 -4.19 -0.34
Salary 0.86 0.72 -16.1 -1.29
» = :92 Economy ¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h
Hours per worker 40.0 35.0 -12.5 1
Employment 0.75 0.79 5.74 0.46
Total hours 30.0 27.6 -7.53 -0.60
Output 1.00 0.87 -12.5 -1.00
Productivity 1.00 0.95 -5.38 -0.43
Salary 0.86 0.71 -17.3 -1.38
» = 1 Economy ¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h
Hours per worker 40.0 35.1 12.2 1
Employment 0.75 0.78 4.00 0.33
Total hours 30.0 27.4 -8.71 -0.71
Output 1.00 0.85 -15.1 -1.23
Productivity 1.00 0.93 -6.98 -0.57
Salary 0.86 0.70 -18.3 -1.50
32Table 8: High commuting costs
Economy High Commuting Costs Baseline
¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h ¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h
Hours per worker 40.0 35.0 -12.5 1 40.0 35.0 -12.5 1
Employment 0.75 0.79 5.25 0.42 0.75 0.80 7.04 0.57
Total hours 30.0 27.6 -7.95 -0.63 30.0 28.0 -6.29 -0.50
Output 1.00 0.88 -11.8 -0.94 1.00 0.90 -10.2 -0.82
Productivity 1.00 0.96 -4.22 -0.34 1.00 0.96 -4.19 -0.34
Salary 0.86 0.72 -16.2 -1.29 0.86 0.72 -16.1 -1.29
The results are very similar to those for the baseline economy. The gains in employment
are just a little smaller. Everything else is about the same. And this happens for an economy
for which average commuting costs are 80% higher. From this exercise, we learn that what
matters is the derivative, which is determined by the relative hours per worker to employment
volatility, and not the actual value of commuting costs.
5.3 Not Matching the Hours–Employment Relative Variation
We next proceed to ask the question of whether it is important to calibrate the economy to
match the relative volatility of hours per worker and employment. We do this by postulating
a constant commuting cost of the same size as in the baseline economy by imposing ¸ = 0,
which eﬀectively assumes no commuting externality. We recalibrate the economy to the
same targets as above except for the aforementioned relative hours per worker–employment
volatility. In this economy, almost all the labor input variation in response to productivity
shocks is in the form of employment (not in hours).
We then put in place the long workweek tax and compare the two steady states which
we report in Table 9, where we have also added a column with the ﬁndings of the baseline to
ease the comparison. The results are striking. The increase in employment generated by the
33workweek reduction policy is 19:7%. This is larger than the decrease in hours per worker,
13:3%, so much larger as to oﬀset the decrease in productivity leaving output basically
unchanged. We see that the prediction over the increase in employment implied by the
policy is three times larger than in the baseline economy.
Table 9: Constant commuting costs
Economy Constant Commuting Costs Baseline
¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h ¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h
Hours per worker 40.0 34.7 -13.3 1 40.0 35.0 -12.5 1
Employment 0.75 0.90 19.7 1.48 0.75 0.80 7.04 0.57
Total hours 30.0 31.1 3.78 0.28 30.0 28.0 -6.29 -0.50
Output 1.00 0.99 -0.88 -0.07 1.00 0.90 -10.2 -0.82
Productivity 1.00 0.96 -4.49 -0.34 1.00 0.96 -4.19 -0.34
Salary 0.86 0.72 -17.2 -1.29 0.86 0.72 -16.1 -1.29
This, we think, is evidence of the importance of matching the hours per worker–employment
relative volatility to impose discipline in the measurement. A naive approach to study the
implications of the policy, that does not use tight evidence to measure the relative substi-
tutability between the two margins of labor, may give a very diﬀerent and inappropriate
answer.
5.4 Higher Employment rate
We perform yet another robustness exercise. This one impose a large value for aggregate
employment. In the baseline model economy we assumed that the ratio of workers to prospec-
tive workers was 0.75. This value may be too low, particularly if we think of prospective
workers as household heads. Therefore, we also calibrate a model economy so that a high
fraction of the working age population works (N = :85). All the other targets remain the
same. We report the parameter values of this model economy in the fourth row of Table 6.
34We then report the ﬁndings in Table 10. The results are very similar to those for the baseline
Table 10: Economy with High Average Employment, N = :85
Economy High Employment Economy Baseline
¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h ¿ = 0 ¿ = 0:12 %var %var
%h
Hours per worker 40.0 35.0 -12.5 1 40.0 35.0 -12.5 1
Employment 0.85 0.90 6.45 0.51 0.75 0.80 7.04 0.57
Total hours 34.0 31.5 -6.90 -0.55 30.0 28.0 -6.29 -0.50
Output 1.00 0.89 -10.8 -0.86 1.00 0.90 -10.2 -0.82
Productivity 1.00 0.96 -4.22 0.34 1.00 0.96 -4.19 -0.34
Salary 0.76 0.63 -16.2 -1.29 0.86 0.72 -16.1 -1.29
economy. The ability to increase employment is a bit lower, generating a elasticity of 0.51.
Everything else is about the same.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have looked at the implications for employment, output and productivity
of a policy aimed at reducing the workweek through taxation of overtime. We have created
imperfect substitutability between hours per worker and employment by means of team work
in production and an externality–based commuting cost. We have shown that it is important
to have a correct measurement of the degree of substitutability between hours per worker
and employment in the model to give an accurate assessment of the employment gains. We
have used business cycles observations to pin down this relative substitutability.
In the baseline model economy, we ﬁnd that a reduction of the workweek from 40 to 35
hours per week requires a tax on overtime earnings of about 12%. The eﬀects on employment
and productivity are a 7% increase in employment and a 4.2% decrease in productivity. An
alternative calibration strategy that also takes into account the cross-sectional distribution
35of workweeks yields slightly diﬀerent answers. The taxes needed to achieve a similar work-
week reduction are larger (about 20%), while the employment gains are smaller, and the
productivity losses larger.
Additional ﬁndings of our work are that the implementation of the policy cushions busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations by about 15% thorough an almost complete shutout of the variation
of hours per worker.
Technical contributions of this paper include the modelling and computation of non-
optimal equilibria in economies where agents labor input varies in both the intensive and
the extensive margin.
As we have pointed out, there are some caveats to our ﬁndings. The ﬁrst one arises
from having used commuting costs subject to congestion as the friction that stands in for a
variety of adjustment costs that are diﬃcult to model appropriately. The second caveat has
to do with our use of business cycle properties to calibrate the extent of the frictions that
determine the relative substitutability between hours per worker and employment. There is
no doubt that our ﬁndings are aﬀected by these assumptions even though in the paper we
have explored a variety of alternative assumptions to give a sense of the range of possible
values for the main variables that we are looking at. We ﬁnd that the answers encountered
under the alternative assumptions are not very diﬀerent from those that arise in the baseline
model economy. Finally, we want to restate that we see the role of this paper as an initial,
not as a ﬁnal formal discussion of the implications of a speciﬁc type of work sharing policy.
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38Appendix
A Computation of the equilibrium
² Step 1: Get ˆ R, the indirect current return function that takes as given the saving
behavior of the household and solves for the optimal x given aggregate H and individ-
ual hours h. The static household problem given its saving behavior, aggregate and








q(c;h) dx + a
0 = (1 + r) a + T (34)
This involves the following:
1. Given aggregate variables, z, K, K0, H, N and T and price functions q and r, com-
pute the optimal choice of the representative household x(z;K;N;q;r;K0;T;H).
2. Given z, H and price functions q and r compute ﬁrm’s capital k and employment
n decisions.
3. Use equilibrium conditions to obtain aggregate variables N and T and prices q,
and r.
4. Given z and r compute the deviation wage, wh, of a household that works h hours.
5. Given z, a, a0, H, h, N and T, and price functions wh and r compute the optimal
choice a household that works h hours x(z;a;N;q;r;a0;T;H;h).
² Step 2: Compute ˜ R(z;a;N;q;r;a0;H) by maximizing ˆ R(z;a;N;q;r;a0;T;H;h) over h.
This involves obtaining optimal hours h(z;a;N;wh;r;a0;T;H).
² Step 3: Use representative agent, gh(z;K;K;Á;G) = GH(z;K), to get R(z;a;N;q;r;a0),
as deﬁned in the paper.
² Step 4: Compute a0 = ga(z;K;a;Á;G) using the previously computed indirect current
return function by solving
39v(z;K;a;Á;G) = max
a0 R(a;N;wh;r;a





r = Ár(z;K) (36)
wh = Áw(z;K;h) (37)
K
0 = GK(z;K) (38)
N = GN(z;K) (39)
H = GH(z;K) (40)
B Tax function
Let ˆ wh be the total payment that the ﬁrm has to make and p( ˆ wh) be the overtime payment,
p( ˆ wh) = ¿(¯ h;h)¢ ˆ wh. If h < ¯ h, then ˆ wh = wh and p( ˆ wh) = 0. Otherwise ˆ wh = wh+¿(¯ h;h)¢ ˆ wh,
that is, the ﬁrm also has to pay the tax on overtime to the government.
As we said in section 2.5, we need the tax function to be diﬀerentiable at h = ¯ h. For that
purpose, we construct a function over the interval [¯ h;¯ ¯ h], where ¯ h is lower than the target of
hours worked, ¯ ¯ h. We can also obtain the associated total payments [ ˆ w¯ h; ˆ w¯ ¯ h].
The tax function has to be such that
1.
@p( ˆ wh)
@ ˆ wh = 0 if ˆ wh · ˆ w¯ h
2.
@p( ˆ wh)
@ ˆ wh = ¿ if ˆ wh ¸ ˆ w¯ ¯ h
3.
@p( ˆ wh)
@ ˆ wh non decreasing if ˆ w¯ h < ˆ wh < ˆ w¯ ¯ h
Let '(ˆ wh) be that function deﬁned over [ ˆ w¯ h; ˆ w¯ ¯ h] . To graph function '(ˆ wh) (see graph):
1. Draw the x-y axis with ˆ wh on the horizontal axis and p( ˆ wh) on the vertical axis, and
let ( ˆ w¯ h,0) be the origin.
2. Draw the line ¿(¯ h;h) ¢ ˆ wh.
3. Fix ˆ w¯ ¯ h.
4. Draw a parabola beginning at the origin [ ˆ w¯ h;0] and ending at coordinate [ ˆ w¯ ¯ h;p(ˆ wh)free].
Note that the value of that ordinate p( ˆ wh) will depend on the curvature of the parabola.
405. Draw a parallel line to ¿(¯ h;h) ¢ ˆ wh, tangent to the parabola at [ ˆ w¯ ¯ h;p( ˆ wh)free].
6. Extend this parallel line until the vertical axis to get the value of the ordinate B
associated to the abscissa ˆ w¯ h.
The problem is to ﬁnd the parameters that deﬁne the generic function '(ˆ wh) = a0+a1 ˆ wh+
a2( ˆ wh)2 + a3( ˆ wh)3 over the interval [ ˆ w¯ h; ˆ w¯ ¯ h], and that satisﬁes the following properties:
1. '( ˆ w¯ h) = 0
2. '0( ˆ w¯ h) = 0
3. '( ˆ w¯ ¯ h) = ¿ ˆ w¯ ¯ h ¡ B
4. '0( ˆ w¯ ¯ h) = ¿
5. '0( ˆ wh) > 0.
Instead of looking for the parameters that ﬁt the above function, we deﬁne a mapping
from [ ˆ w¯ h; ˆ w¯ ¯ h] to [0;1]. The new function, '
³
ˆ wh¡ ˆ w¯ h
ˆ w¯ ¯ h¡ ˆ w¯ h
´
, takes values on [0;1], that is,
if ˆ wh = ˆ w¯ h, then '(0),
and if ˆ wh = ˆ w¯ ¯ h, then '(1).
Now, we impose the above mentioned properties. Property 1 implies a0 = 0. Property 2
implies a1 = 0. Fix a3 = 0 to end up with a quadratic function (the parabola)
'
µ
ˆ wh ¡ ˆ w¯ h




ˆ wh ¡ ˆ w¯ h
ˆ w¯ ¯ h ¡ ˆ w¯ h
¶2
To ﬁnd the values of the remaining parameters, a2 and B, apply properties 3 and 4 to that
quadratic function and choose the value of the policy parameter ¿. We get two expressions
in the two unknowns, a2 and B
a2 = ¿ ˆ w¯ ¯ h ¡ B
2a2 = ¿( ˆ w¯ ¯ h ¡ ˆ w¯ h)
Finally, the tax function is:
41p( ˆ wh) = 0, if ˆ wh · ˆ w¯ h
p( ˆ wh) = a2
³
ˆ wh¡ ˆ w¯ h
ˆ w¯ ¯ h¡ ˆ w¯ h
´2
, if ˆ w¯ h < ˆ wh < ˆ w¯ ¯ h
p( ˆ wh) = ¿ ˆ wh ¡ B, if ˆ wh ¸ ˆ w¯ ¯ h
42